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Defending International Sentencing:
Past Criticism to the Promise of the ICC
by Marisa R. Bassett*

ICTR, however, operate with scant additional formal guidance,
causing sentencing practice at these two most established international courts to appear unsupported, confused, and cluttered.

Penalties that Reflect Gravity

Courtesy of Michplay

The appropriate punishment for serious human rights violations, including international crimes, is a term of imprisonment
commensurate with the gravity of the crime. International criminal law began reflecting this proportionality following World
War II and continues to do so. The statutes creating the ICTY,
ICTR, and ICC call on each court to consider the “gravity” of
the crime in determining an appropriate penalty.3
International law provides little further guidance on proper
sentencing for international crimes. This relative lack of guidance springs from the fact that international crimes have gone
largely unprosecuted and unpunished. Also, most human rights
crimes that are prosecuted are heard by national courts; thus,
domestic systems handle sentencing, employing their own criteria. Finally, fostering agreement between states on why and how
to punish is extremely difficult.

The International Criminal Court building in The Hague,
The Netherlands.

O

ver the past 15 years, the world has experienced a
rebirth of international criminal law. The first international courts since the close of the Second World War,
the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY) paved the way for hybrid courts.
The 2002 establishment of a permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC) demonstrates that international criminal law will be
a feature of the international legal landscape indefinitely.
The work of the ICTY and ICTR has given rise to much
scholarship. This article examines one branch of this scholarship—criticism of international sentencing. The article lays out
critiques, which are not without merit, but responds that these
critiques are overstated and misplaced as they undervalue the
importance of aggravating and mitigating factors and rely on
a flawed analogy between domestic and international criminal
law. The article then turns to the ICC with these criticisms in
mind, and concludes that the ICC’s guidance on penalties could
lead that Court to take a more precise approach, improving international sentencing practice.

Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR
The formal sentencing guidance of the ICTY and ICTR is
nearly identical. The tribunals must issue prison sentences. To
determine appropriate sentences, tribunals should impose penalties that reflect the gravity of the crime, while considering “the
individual circumstances of the convicted person.” They may
also look to “practice regarding prison sentences” in the state
where the crimes were committed.4 The tribunals’ Rules of
Evidence and Procedure contain additional provisions, but again
guidance is scant. The Rules allow consideration of aggravating and mitigating “circumstances” but do not offer definitions
other than to characterize “substantial cooperation with the
Prosecutor” as mitigating.5
Sentencing appears to vary greatly as a result of these brief
provisions. Decisions typically account for a crime’s gravity, many even explicitly invoke proportionality.6 Yet despite
employing identical provisions on gravity’s role, the tribunals
have approached its determination differently. The ICTR determines the gravity of a crime based on its inherent elements,
invoking a partial hierarchy under which genocide is most serious.7 The ICTY, however, approaches the question subjectively,
allowing the context of the crime and the convicted to enter the
determination.8
Emphasis on gravity suggests that retribution is the major
theoretical underpinning behind international punishment, but
the tribunals also consider other theories. They often look to
deterrence, particularly general deterrence.9 Other theories
are linked to consideration of “individual circumstances.”

International Sentencing
Punishing human rights violations with penalties proportionate to the gravity of their crimes has become a norm of international law.1 The penalties provisions of the agreements creating
the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC reflect this norm.2 The ICTY and
*
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[I]nconsistency and leniency are not the fatal flaws
that critics purport. In practice, the tribunals’
sentences are more consistent, more punitive, and more
in accordance with gravity than critics suggest.
Rehabilitation is sometimes a consideration.10 As in domestic
systems, the impact of these theories on resulting sentences
remains unclear.
In practice, ICTY and ICTR sentencing relies heavily on
evaluating aggravating and mitigating circumstances. With
little guidance on these factors, the jurisprudence defines which
circumstances to consider and what these circumstances are.
Aggravating circumstances include the position of the convicted;
his or her degree of involvement in the crime; premeditation;
the nature of the act; and the victims’ status and vulnerability.
Mitigating circumstances include entering a guilty plea; displaying remorse; acting under duress; surrendering voluntarily; and
the convicted’s age and personal circumstances.11
Although the Rules guide both tribunals to consider domestic
sentencing regimes of the respective states,12 the tribunals have
made little use of this provision. Jurisprudence makes clear that
domestic practice does not bind tribunal judges. This determination removes the difficulty of interpreting how to incorporate
Rwanda’s and former Yugoslav republics’ use of capital punishment into modern international criminal law, which prohibits
the practice.13

“individual circumstances.” Some judges interpret “individual
circumstances of the convicted” as an element contributing to a
crime’s gravity—the circumstances of the crime and the criminal can heighten or lessen the gravity of the crime itself. Others
interpret this wording to mean that crimes have inherent gravity, independent of subjective circumstances. This split mirrors
the difference between the ICTY’s and ICTR’s approaches to
determining gravity.
Both of these critiques lead scholars to the same conclusions:
the ICTY and ICTR issue inconsistent, and often, unduly lenient
sentences. Purported leniency, however, appears to resonate
particularly strongly.18 For this reason, no case draws greater
criticism than Prosecutor v. Erdemovic´ .
Drazen Erdemovic´ , a young, low-level soldier charged with
war crimes and crimes against humanity for participating in a
massacre, estimated that he shot 70 men.19 Erdemovic´ initially
pled guilty to the higher of his charges, causing some judges
to conclude that he was ill-informed, prompting rehearing.20
He then pled to the lower charge and received a five-year sentence.21
Reconciling this outcome is difficult for some observers.
Critics, however, misunderstand Erdemovic´ . Numerous miti
gating factors, including duress and cooperation with the
Prosecutor, are the major reason behind his brief sentence.22 The
outcome is also an anomaly. Erdemovic´ ’s sentence remains the
ICTY’s second shortest.
Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding Erdemovic´
clearly influenced his sentence. His initial trial produced the
ICTY’s first sentencing judgment. Judges were struggling with
new, vague sentencing criteria, striving to issue an appropriate sentence with uncertainty in the future docket. Facing the
prospect of trying high-level leaders accused of orchestrating
larger-scale massacres, judges may not have wanted to heavily
penalize Erdemovic´. Doing so would have reduced the tribunal’s
ability to maneuver on sentencing in later cases. If consistency
is measured by relative sentence length, a high sentence would
set a benchmark, committing the tribunal to long sentences in
all cases.23 Judges were also likely concerned with perceived
fairness. Issuing its inaugural sentence against a defendant
who appeared ill-informed would subject defense structures to
criticism, upsetting a major underpinning of human rights and
justice and calling the tribunal’s fairness into question.
Criticism of Erdemovic´ aside, observers correctly argue
that lack of uniformity and seeming leniency of sentencing are
inconsistent with the norm of issuing penalties commensurate

Criticism of International Sentencing
Against this background, observers have written much about
international sentencing’s deficiencies. Most criticism starts
from the premise that international sentencing criteria are limited and underdeveloped. At the root of the criticism is concern
that international penalties do not adequately reflect the gravity
of the crimes, either because international courts inconsistently
punish similar crimes14 or because they are per se lenient.15
The extreme gravity of international crimes only heightens this
concern.
International sentencing’s critics are comprised of practitioners and academics of varying nationalities. Their criticism falls
into two categories. First, observers criticize the ICTY and ICTR
for lacking a coherent theory of punishment.16 Although consideration of gravity suggests a retributive theory, the Statutes—
particularly their reference to “individual circumstances”—raise
alternate theories. The tribunals’ jurisprudence has fueled criticism by seemingly relying on every potential theory of punishment at different points.
Second, observers criticize the tribunals for not developing
or inconsistently applying a hierarchy of crimes.17 The absence
of a hierarchy complicates the ability to penalize in a manner
commensurate with gravity. This critique questions the use of
23

with gravity. Dissimilar sentences in like cases and lenient
penalties for serious violations also raise questions of court bias
and risk international justice’s credibility. These concerns cause
some critics to declare that the ICTY and ICTR have contributed
little to sentencing that might guide the ICC.24

Dismissing these two hypothesized causes of international
sentencing’s problems leaves another possible source—the use
of aggravating and mitigating factors. Critics have been less
willing to point a finger at this aspect of the sentencing scheme,
possibly because it is a common and valued feature of many
domestic systems. Aggravating and particularly mitigating
circumstances, however, have strong influence on the ultimate
sentencing determinations of the tribunals.

Responding to Critics
Although critics are correct that the tribunals lack a uniform
theory of punishment and have split on the question of inherent gravity, these attributes are not the root cause of sentence
variation or short sentences. Furthermore, inconsistency and
leniency are not the fatal flaws that critics purport. In practice,
the tribunals’ sentences are more consistent, more punitive,
and more in accordance with gravity than critics suggest.25 The
leniency criticism is rooted in an imprecise, impractical analogy
between international and domestic criminal law. In fact, case
law shows that sentences generally fall within specific ranges,
dictated by the crimes, and that these ranges vary appropriately
with the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The aspects of sentencing that critics find problematic are simply a reflection of individualized sentencing, achieved through
the application of these circumstances.

Inconsistency in Sentencing is Myth
International sentences are not as divergent as some critics
suggest. Although the tribunals’ sentences vary, case law demonstrates they typically fall within certain ranges. As one ICTR
judgment notes, although “awarding a single sentence” for multiple crimes complicates the ability to determine the range of
sentences issued for specific crimes, one can “ascertain general
ranges” useful to consider in future cases. The ICTR went on to
discuss typical penalties at the ICTY and ICTR. “[P]erpetrators
convicted of . . . genocide or extermination as a crime against
humanity” typically receive sentences “ranging from fifteen
years’ . . . to life imprisonment.” As crimes against humanity,
rape generally results in 12- to 15-year sentences; torture, five
to 12 years; and murder, 12 to 20 years.31
These ranges are not particularly varied. In fact, they vary
less than sentences in many domestic systems. In some cases,
international penalties are lighter than domestic sentences.
Perceived leniency aside, however, viewing ICTY and ICTR
sentencing decisions collectively as an independent body of
jurisprudence, the sentences associated with each crime fall into
rather narrow ranges that vary, as in most systems, with the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Variety Results from Aggravating and
Mitigating Circumstances
ICTY and ICTR sentencing criteria inevitably lead to some
inconsistency. This result is due more to extensive employment
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, than to elements
on which critics focus. The consideration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances is important to preserving individualized sentences and should not be eliminated. Modern criminal
law, both internationally and in general, favors individualization.26
Adding a clearly articulated, overarching theory of punishment to the tribunals’ vague sentencing guidelines will not lead
to consistent results.27 The effect that theories have on sentences
length remains unclear, both in international and domestic contexts. Moreover, getting international judges to agree on one or
even several theories will be difficult.28 The most that a coherent theory of punishment can do is reiterate the importance of
gravity in sentencing or, alternately, emphasize another purpose
of punishment.
Furthermore, multiple theories of punishment working simultaneously do not inevitably lead to inconsistent results. One
gauges consistency by the sentences, not how judges reach their
conclusions: judges weigh factors differently, but ultimately, it
is the sentence itself that matters.29 A single theory might guide
judges, but it alone cannot achieve consistency.
Similarly, a hierarchy of crimes alone cannot make sentencing consistent. Courts would need to agree that gravity comes
from the crime itself, comprised solely of its elements. Although
such an inter-court agreement might be achievable and could
encourage consistency, tribunals still act under a framework
in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances shape sentences. The ICTR employs a partial inherent gravity approach,
but its sentences still vary, even when issued for the same
crime.30 Conversely, if courts chose to employ a contextual
determination of gravity, ranking it will remain as difficult and
have as little effect as in current ICTY practice.

The Leniency Critique is Flawed
The more impassioned critique of international sentencing is
that sentences are unduly lenient. Objectively, however, ICTY
and ICTR jurisprudence is not as lenient as critics suggest.
Rather, the tribunals routinely hand down long prison sentences.
A 2002 study showed that the majority of those convicted by the
ICTR were serving life sentences, and that the mean sentence at
the ICTY was 16 years.32 Furthermore, the ICTY has handed
down a significant number of sentences exceeding 16 years.33
The ICTR’s non-life sentences are also lengthy, with a number
exceeding 20 years.34
Conversely, application of mitigating circumstances often
reduces sentence lengths. This is the intended and appropriate role of these circumstances, however, in international and
domestic law. The tribunals, especially the ICTY, have issued
a number of sentences in the seven to twelve year range, even
for relatively serious offenses, largely because of these circumstances.35
Underlying the leniency criticism is a misplaced comparison
between domestic and international sentencing. More properly
stated, the critique is not that international sentencing is lenient,
but that it is lenient relative to domestic practice. There is some
truth to this argument: international sentences are shorter than
sentences in some national systems, but this is not true universally.36
The leniency criticism is also flawed more fundamentally.
Comparing international and domestic sentencing is inappropri24

ate. The international criminal system is not a national system
operating supra-nationally. International criminal law is distinct from its domestic counterpart. Murder as a crime against
humanity differs from murder; rape as a war crime includes different elements from those in domestic definitions.37 For proper
perspective, international sentences must be examined relative
to one another rather than relative to domestic sentences. In
this light, international sentences are typically stringent, even
in cases with numerous mitigating circumstances.38 When the
tribunals have issued short sentences, extenuating circumstances
were at work.

Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC’s Rules of Evidence
and Procedure offer significant additional guidance on sentencing. Rule 145 instructs judges to consider 12 enumerated “factors,” and then “balance all the relevant factors” to develop a
sentence that, in “totality[,] . . . reflect[s] . . . culpability. . . .”
The Rule also contains lists of mitigating and aggravating “circumstances.” The lists of “factors” and “circumstances” include
information relevant both to the facts of the crime and the
convicted, although neither list is exhaustive. Finally, Rule 145
elaborates that the “existence of one or more aggravating circumstances” may be sufficient to impose life imprisonment. 44

Can the ICC Improve International Sentencing?
The ICC’s sentencing guidance remains relatively unexplored in scholarship. Addressing this gap is important, but it
makes analyzing the guidance challenging, and makes considering potential approaches to sentencing speculative. The ICC’s
more detailed guidance is an achievement. Because the Rome
Statute strives to create a uniform, universal system of penalization, drafting these provisions required compromise. Those
involved manifested their interest in improving the precision of
international sentencing. The improved guidance suggests that
sentencing decisions will be more understandable and grounded
than those of previous courts. If ICC judges follow the drafters’
lead, they will also attempt greater precision.
Without case law to test this prediction, one must turn to a
hypothetical. Erdemovic´ provides an apt example. If the ICC
were to hear Erdemovic´ , it would begin from an advantaged
perspective. For example, Rule 145 establishes duress as a mitigating circumstance, whereas ICTY judges made this determination. Additionally, the ICC Rules suggest that remorse, a mitigating circumstance that the ICTY recognizes, is an appropriate
mitigating circumstance. In short, the ICC’s guidance suggests
that ICC and ICTY judges would agree on Erdemovic´ ’s major
mitigating circumstances. ICC judges could also more easily
recognize certain aggravating factors in Erdemovic´ , such as the
large number and vulnerability of victims, and discriminatory
motive. Interestingly, because aggravating factors exist, the ICC
Rules would allow the Court to consider life imprisonment, indicating that judges might consider a longer sentence.
Although the ICC’s additional guidance could simplify
judges’ work, it still endows judges with significant discretion
over sentencing, thus failing to address inconsistency critiques.
Three issues present questions. First, the ICC Rules call for the
Court to “balance” aggravating and mitigating circumstances
with other “factors,” but do not provide any guidance on relative
weight of these considerations or how to conduct this balancing.
Whether Erdemovic´ ’s duress, cooperation, and remorse would
outweigh aggravating circumstances is an open question. Second,
the ICC’s lists of mitigating and aggravating circumstances are
non-exhaustive. It remains uncertain whether mitigating circumstances that the ICTY considered, such as Erdemovic’s age
and family situation, would be relevant. Finally, the role that
the “factors” play in sentencing is unclear. The listed factors
relate to both the crime and the convicted. They are also not
conclusively mitigating or aggravating.45 Rather, they seem to
comprise a list of umbrella considerations for judges seeking to
define additional, non-enumerated aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Judges might consider these issues in striving to
improve sentencing precision.

Selectively looking to
ICTY and ICTR practice
could help the ICC answer
these open questions, while
avoiding past pitfalls and
working to strengthen
sentencing practice.
Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, international courts
cannot account for domestic law in sentencing. With so many
states involved, it is extremely difficult to reach agreement. If
ICC judges were concerned about sentences seeming lenient
relative to domestic law, they would either have to examine
domestic law in each case or resort to the strictest penal law
of all member states. The Rome Statute appears to prohibit the
first scenario.39 Its application would sacrifice sentencing consistency, causing the ICC to fail to create a uniform penalties
regime.40 The second scenario creates distressing results: the
harshest (even disfavored) penal systems would set the international standard.

Looking Forward:
The Promise of the ICC
The ICC’s formal guidance on sentencing is more extensive
than that of the ICTY or ICTR, but it remains untested. The
Rome Statute’s penalties provisions resemble those in the ICTY
and ICTR Statutes. The “gravity of the crime” and the “individual circumstances of the convicted person” are the two main
considerations.41 Due to the ICC’s worldwide jurisdiction, the
Rome Statute does not provide recourse to national practice.42 In
an effort to increase certainty in penalization, the Rome Statute
elaborates on sentence length. It caps imprisonment at 30 years
but permits life imprisonment “when justified by the extreme
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the
convicted person.”43
25

Recommendations:
Past Practice as Guidance

Precisely Define Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances and Clarify Effects on Sentences

Selectively looking to ICTY and ICTR practice could help
the ICC answer these open questions, while avoiding past pitfalls and working to strengthen sentencing practice. Although
the ICC has held that it will not simply “import” the practice
of the ICTY and ICTR, its judges can learn from these predecessors.46 Judges can choose to absorb certain practices while
circumventing problematic aspects. Selectivity will help the
ICC create a uniform penalties regime that represents development in international sentencing, while avoiding confusion and
inconsistency that would come with endorsing all international
jurisprudence.
For the ICC to develop credibility and legitimacy, welldefined criteria on what constitutes an aggravating or mitigating circumstance and how these circumstances affect sentence
length are necessary. ICC judges, however, might hesitate to
establish guidelines that limit judicial discretion.47 Therefore,
the following recommendations are intentionally broad.

ICC judges should strive to define aggravating and mitigating circumstances precisely, and better articulate their application. Given the numerous, diverse states involved with the ICC,
the likelihood that members or judges will agree upon a theory
of punishment is low. Clarifying the definition and significance
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, however, is a
major and achievable step toward improving international sentencing’s flaws. Clearer jurisprudence on these topics will allow
the ICC to develop international sentencing coherently, while
preserving judicial discretion.
Despite the advantages of clearer formal guidance and the
ability to examine past practice, the Rome Statute and the
ICC Rules leave open significant questions about the role and
relevance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and of
the additional sentencing “factors.” The named factors might
help judges define additional aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and articulate them with greater precision. ICC
judges may wish to consider certain aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are well-established in ICTY and ICTR
jurisprudence and suggested by the ICC Rules. These include
leadership role or high position, humiliating nature of the crime,
and remorse.
The tribunals’ jurisprudence also offers guidelines on the
weight that these circumstances carry. For example, case law
often describes which mitigating circumstances warrant substantial reductions in sentence versus those that have little impact.50
ICC judges should make similar determinations.

Examine Sentencing Ranges and Effect of
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
ICC judges should examine the range of sentences that the
tribunals have issued for analogous cases. Examining single
cases will rarely be helpful. Given the ICC’s “message of relative clemency,”48 looking to ranges of ICTY sentences—which
are typically lighter—may be useful. ICTR case law may also
guide judges, specifically in determining when “extreme gravity” warrants life imprisonment.49
The importance of individualized sentencing makes examining ranges essential. Sentencing ranges can elucidate how ICC
judges might appropriately “balance” sentencing factors and
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Because aggravating
and mitigating circumstances are the primary reason for sentence
variety, they are largely responsible for the existence of ranges.
By looking to these ranges, judges can observe the weight that
circumstances carry and their effect on sentences. Given the ICC
Rules’ instruction that judges consider “circumstances . . . of
the convicted . . . and of the crime” and additional “factors,” the
ICTY’s contextual case law might be particularly helpful.

Conclusion
Current international sentencing practice is not without
flaws. Given the early stage of development of the field, flaws
are understandable, but are also less severe than scholarship
suggests. The ICC has the potential to improve international
sentencing practice, and will undertake its early sentencing
judgments with more precise guidance than its predecessors did,
benefitting from the experience of the ICTY and ICTR. The ICC
judges would be wise not to approach sentencing from within
the vacuum of the Rome Statute and the ICC Rules, but instead
to draw on past experience. This approach will help develop
international sentencing and improve international criminal law
as whole.		
HRB
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Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (Appeals Chamber), July 20, 2005,
¶ 136 (referring to retribution and deterrence as the “main purposes
of sentencing”); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR, Case No. ICTR96-3, Judgment and Sentence (Trial Chamber), Dec. 6, 1999, ¶ 456.
10 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bralo, ICTY, Case No. IT-95-17,
Sentencing Judgment (Trial Chamber), Dec. 7, 2005 ¶ 22.
11 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Genocide, War Crimes &
Crimes against Humanity: A Topical Digest of the Case Law of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
578, 580, 584, 590-95, 598-604, 607, 621-32, 633-39, 639-42,
644-46, 653-56, 660-61 (2006); Human Rights Watch, Genocide,
War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity: Topical Digests of the
Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia 82-84, 85-87, 88-89 (2004).
12 See ICTY Rules, supra note 6, R. 101(B)(iii); ICTR Rules, supra
note 14, R. 101(B)(iii).
13 See generally William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes against
Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60 Albany L. Rev. 733 (1993).
14 See Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, International Sentencing Law:
In Search of a Justification and Coherent Framework, International
Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and Coherent
Framework, 6 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 191, 193 (2006) (calling
international sentencing “marked . . . by discretion and uncertainty”
with regard to appropriate penalties); Allison Marston Danner,
Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal
Law Sentencing, 87 Va. L. Rev. 415, 501 (2001) (criticizing the
“coherency” of international justice at the ICTY and ICTR).
15 See, e.g., Steven Glickman, Note, Victim’s Justice: Legitimizing
the Sentencing Regime of the International Criminal Court, 43
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 229, 245(2004) (expressing frustration
that international sentences do not adequately “weigh” a crime’s

gravity and, thus, infrequently dispense retributive justice);
Bagaric & Morss, supra note 15, at 253 (calling tribunal sentences
“breathtakingly light”).
16 See, e.g., Danner, supra note 15, at 444-53;Glickman, supra note
16, at 230.
17 See, e.g., id. at 501 (criticizing incongruence resulting from the
ICTR’s use of such a hierarchy); Carcano, supra note 9, at 591, 609.
18 See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 1, at 83 (“[E]motively, virtually all
of the . . . crimes [under international criminal jurisdiction] seem
to demand the harshest penalties”); Glickman, supra note 16, at
230 (“the prison sentences . . . issued by [international courts]
have not adequately expressed the extreme moral outrage that the
international community must convey . . . .”).
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